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Since the 1950s, despite being extremely poor and having very limited financial resources, China has done its best to provide foreign aid. From 1950 to 1959, China's total budget expenditure on foreign aid was approximately 2.6 billion RMB, with annual expenditures ranging from 100 million to 400 million RMB, accounting for about 0.1% to 0.5% of GDP and about 0.6% to 1.7% of the national overall fiscal budget expenditure.
As time moved into the 1960s and 1970s, due to changes in the diplomatic situation, the scope of China's foreign aid gradually expanded, increasing the methods of aid to include technical assistance and complete projects, with aid costs almost disregarding cost and price. From 1971 to 1978, China undertook a total of 509 complete projects in foreign aid, helping 37 countries complete a record number of 470 complete projects.
These included significant projects such as the Hama Spinning Factory in Syria (the most important large-scale productive project aided by China in Syria, completed in 1971), the Bandaranaike International Conference Hall in Sri Lanka (the most important iconic public works project aided by China in South Asia, supporting Sri Lanka in hosting the 1976 Non-Aligned Movement summit, completed in 1973), the Pyongyang Metro in North Korea (the first modern urban rail project aided by China, completed in 1975), the Elbasan Metallurgical Combine in Albania (the most important heavy industry complete project aided by China in Albania, partially completed in 1975), the Taz Revolutionary Hospital in North Yemen (the most important comprehensive medical and health project aided by China in West Asia, completed in 1975), and the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan (also known as the China-Pakistan Friendship Highway, the most important land artery connecting China to Pakistan and leading to the South Asian subcontinent and the Middle East, completed in 1978), among many other costly projects.
Especially after China regained its legitimate seat in the United Nations in 1971, the amount of foreign aid increased dramatically again. From 1971 to 1975, China held five national foreign aid work conferences in succession, with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council directly deploying China's foreign aid strategic guidelines. During the period from 1960 to 1977, China's foreign aid budget expenditure sharply increased due to the surge in demand from recipient countries, with total expenditures amounting to approximately 19.5 billion RMB, and annual expenditures growing from 140 million RMB in 1960 to 5.58 billion RMB in 1973 (equivalent to the world's largest foreign aid country, the United States, at that year's exchange rate), with the proportion of GDP once reaching as high as 2% and the proportion of the national overall fiscal budget expenditure peaking at 6.9%, placing a significant burden on the national fiscal economy.
From 1949 to 1979, the Chinese government’s total fiscal expenditure on foreign aid (including military aid) amounted to 48.304 billion RMB, accounting for an average of 3.5% of the annual total national fiscal expenditure, far exceeding that of the United States and the Soviet Union during the same period. According to statistics from the National Planning Commission, socialist countries such as Vietnam, North Korea, and Albania received approximately 80% of the aid, while African countries ranked second, receiving about 13%-15%.
North Korea:
China's aid to North Korea began during the Korean War. In addition to sending volunteer troops and providing direct material assistance to the North Korean government, China also bore many intangible expenses for North Korea.
For instance, in terms of railway transportation expenses, from the establishment of the Sino-Korean Joint Transport Command in 1951 to the end of 1953, 200 million RMB was spent, with direct aid to North Korea accounting for 95%. More importantly, China made great efforts to alleviate the suffering of the North Korean people. Over three years, the Chinese government provided a large amount of economic and living material assistance to North Korea, with a total value of approximately 73 million RMB (by the end of 1953). Additionally, a nationwide donation campaign was quite effective; by May 1952, the Chinese people had donated an amount equivalent to the value of 3,710 aircraft, and the China Relief Association sent large quantities of food and daily necessities.
Resettling and providing relief to North Korean refugees was also an important aspect of China's assistance to North Korea. During the war, approximately 13,000 North Korean refugees were evacuated to China (of which 11,000 were settled in Yanbian). Governments in northern regions issued special notices and regulations for this purpose. For example, Hebei Province combined the relief for North Korean refugees with the care for volunteer soldiers, initiating a fundraising campaign. Rehe Province first launched a donation campaign centered around county towns, which later spread to every village, factory, school, and street, requiring weekly reports on donation status. Shanxi Province published ten regulations in the Shanxi Daily, making the mobilization of funds for North Korean refugees a central task of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, requiring members to take the lead in donations.
In the Northeast, especially in Yanbian County, the responsibility was even greater. In November 1950, Yanbian set up reception stations and liaison offices in various places such as Jichao, Kaishantun, Tumen, Nanping, Liangshuizhuan, and Quanhe, specifically responsible for reception and resettlement work. The relief funds, in addition to those borne by the commissioner’s office, also mobilized local citizens to donate, with those who had money contributing money, those with houses offering housing, those with clothes providing clothing, and those with grain donating grain. During the three years of war, Yanbian resettled a total of 11,728 North Korean refugees, providing relief funds of 1.488 billion Northeast coins, 43,180 pieces of clothing, and repatriation expenses of 1.01 billion. Additionally, Yanbian County also set up reception stations for the wounded and rear hospitals, taking in and treating over 50,000 North Korean wounded and sick in just the second half of 1950.
After the Korean War ended, China provided massive aid for North Korea's reconstruction.
China's aid included: from June 1950 to the end of 1953, the 729 million RMB (equivalent to 1.45 billion rubles) provided to North Korea was entirely exempt from repayment; within a four-year period (1954-1957), an additional 800 million RMB (equivalent to 1.6 billion rubles) of grant aid was provided, of which 300 million RMB was provided in 1954. These funds were provided to North Korea in the form of material assistance: 3.35 million tons of coal, 280,000 tons of coke, 33,900 tons of cotton, 0.3 tons of cotton yarn, 87,200 meters of cotton textiles, 410,000 tons of corn, 4,000 tons of rice, 170,000 tons of soybeans, 11,200 tons of rubber, 1,250 tons of paper, 52,900 tons of steel products, 5,500 tons of rails, 1,600 passenger and freight cars, 1,500 vehicle tires, 4,000 handcarts, and 20,000 tons of various types of metal pipes, totaling over 3,000 varieties. According to East German archives, in 1953, China also signed another aid agreement with North Korea for 15 million RMB (equivalent to 27.6 million rubles). Of this supplementary aid, 66.3% was fulfilled in the form of materials, such as coal, cotton, transportation materials, chemical raw materials, medicines, and daily consumer goods, while the remaining 33.7% was fulfilled in the form of project investments, such as restoring and constructing railways, transportation, and training experts. Additionally, from 1954 to 1956, China also adopted 22,735 North Korean refugee children and bore the living expenses of 7,186 North Korean citizens and their family members responsible for educating these children.
The conditions for aid to North Korea from China were much more favorable than those from the Soviet Union. At that time, for Chinese experts going to North Korea, the North Korean government only needed to pay them the equivalent salary they received in China (including travel and allowances), medical expenses, accommodation, and transportation costs, without bearing any other expenses. In contrast, according to the requirements for Soviet experts, in addition to the aforementioned expenses, the North Korean government had to pay each expert travel expenses equivalent to one month's salary in the Soviet Union, vacation allowances, and subsidies equivalent to two months' salary (for higher education institutions), especially having to pay the Soviet government 2,000-4,000 rubles per month as compensation for the original unit's losses based on the expert's technical level.
North Korean employees coming to China for internships could enjoy the same treatment as Chinese technical personnel or skilled workers, including free medical care, only needing to pay accommodation fees. The North Korean government only bore the travel expenses for the interns. According to Soviet regulations on accepting interns, all expenses had to be borne by the North Korean side, and they also had to pay for the guidance of the interns, averaging 100-150 rubles per person per month. For North Korean students studying in China, the Chinese side only charged the North Korean government for the scholarships and domestic travel expenses given to the students, while the Soviet Union charged 50% of all expenses, including teaching and accommodation. Comparing the aid 力度 from China and the Soviet Union to North Korea, even the Far East Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt overshadowed and suggested jointly with the Ministry of Finance to propose amendments to the relevant clauses of the Sino-Soviet agreement.
In addition to financial, technical, and material assistance, hundreds of thousands of volunteer soldiers provided a large amount of unpaid labor for North Korea.
Within three months after the ceasefire, the volunteer railway troops repaired, renovated, and newly built 308 bridges, totaling 15,000 meters, and repaired 37 stations, restoring the original railway lines in northern North Korea. Additionally, in urban reconstruction, building dams, river embankments, water channels, afforestation, spring sowing, autumn planting, constructing houses, and repairing school buildings, the volunteer troops also invested significant manpower. In just the first half of 1957, the volunteer troops contributed 430,000 labor days to North Korea's economic construction. Before the complete withdrawal of troops in 1958, the volunteer troops helped North Korea build 881 public places, 45,412 houses, repair and construct 4,263 bridges, build 4,096 embankments totaling 429,220 meters, construct 2,295 water channels totaling 1,218.71 kilometers, conduct field labor over 850 million square meters, deliver 13.146 million quintals of manure, plant 36.086 million trees, and transport 63,853 tons of food supplies. Additionally, the volunteer soldiers also economized on food, saving 21.2605 million jin of grain and 589,000 pieces of clothing, and treated North Koreans 1.8839 million times.
Later, when North Korea faced a food crisis in 1954 and 1955, China provided 130,000 tons and 150,000 tons of grain, respectively. After that, China's aid to North Korea continued without interruption, constantly providing material assistance. According to Xinhua News Agency reports: In 1970, China provided 150,000 tons of oil to North Korea, which increased to 1.4 million tons in 1972. In 1972, China and North Korea agreed to jointly construct an oil pipeline, which broke ground in February 1974 and was completed in January 1976, with an annual oil transport capacity of 4 million tons.
Vietnam:
China's aid to Vietnam began in 1949. In December of that year, the Central Committee of the Indochinese Communist Party sent two representatives to Beijing, requesting the Chinese Communist Party to provide equipment for three divisions and 10 million USD in aid.
As the situation of the war between Vietnam and France changed, China's aid to Vietnam began to increase further. In early 1951, the Chinese advisory group helped the Vietnamese military headquarters draft the "Plan for Building Main Forces" and compile an equipment plan, starting to assist Vietnam in forming infantry divisions and artillery divisions. From 1951 to 1954, the Chinese advisory group helped Vietnam successively hold eight training sessions for cadres, essentially rotating training for all cadres above the company level in the northern forces, with some cadre above the regiment level in the southern forces also participating in the training.
Additionally, China also helped Vietnam establish military schools and reorganize troops within its own territory, during which "supplies and other matters must be the responsibility of China." During this period, China helped train infantry, artillery, engineering, and communication troops for the Vietnamese army, training tens of thousands of mid-level commanders and professional technical personnel over several years. By the time of the ceasefire in 1954, the Vietnamese army had grown from 50,000 at the beginning of the anti-French war to 330,000, forming (building) 12 divisions, 11 independent regiments, 2 engineering regiments, and 4 artillery regiments, with a significant improvement in combat effectiveness.
As the war continued, Vietnam faced a huge gap in finances and materials, and despite its own significant difficulties, China still provided substantial aid to Vietnam. From 1950 to 1954, China provided a total of 176 million RMB in material aid to Vietnam. According to incomplete statistics, China provided the Vietnamese People's Army with over 155,000 firearms, 57.85 million rounds of ammunition, over 3,600 artillery pieces, over 1.08 million rounds of artillery shells, 840,000 grenades, over 1,200 vehicles, 1.4 million sets of military uniforms, and over 14,000 tons of food and sideline products, as well as 26,000 tons of oil and a large amount of medicines and other materials.
After 1956, both the quantity and quality of China's military aid to Vietnam began to increase significantly. In 1962, when Ho Chi Minh visited China to request aid, China unconditionally provided 90,000 firearms. From 1956 to 1963, the total value of military aid from China to northern Vietnam was 320 million RMB, including 270,000 various firearms, over 10,000 artillery pieces, nearly 200 million rounds of ammunition, 2.02 million rounds of artillery shells, 15,000 wired radios, about 5,000 wireless radios, over 1,000 vehicles, 15 aircraft, 28 ships, and over 15,000 vehicles, as well as 3 sets of surface-to-air missile systems, 180 missiles, 260 radars, 32,000 wired radios, 49,000 wired radios, 4,834 engineering machines, 15 sets of floating bridges, and over 1 billion rounds of various ammunition, 16.6 million rounds of artillery shells, and 190,000 landmines, 15,000 tons of explosives, as well as chemical defense, observation, reconnaissance equipment, and a large amount of military supplies.
China's material assistance was comprehensive, including not only military supplies but also living and production materials. For example, according to a notice from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 14, 1967, requesting Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and 13 provinces to provide free vegetable seeds to Vietnam, the aid list included 22 varieties, totaling over 40 tons! Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Hunan provinces made significant contributions to aid to Vietnam, with the materials covering all aspects of agricultural, forestry, animal husbandry, sideline, and fishery production and life. The four provinces also dispatched experts to aid Vietnam, establishing economic representative offices in Vietnam. The main work of the representative offices in Vietnam included: first, focusing on water conservancy, with 12 water wheel pumps already in place in four provinces of Quang Ninh, Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Hoa Binh, and three more under construction; second, focusing on green manure, promoting new agricultural tools such as hoes and plows, and promoting new technologies.
All of these were free aid, and even in the case of paid aid, Vietnam compensated with other materials, but the compensated materials were far from enough compared to what China provided to Vietnam, making Vietnam the beneficiary. A report from Yunnan Province to the central government pointed out that the phosphorus ore supplied by Vietnam to Yunnan was priced at 36 RMB per ton, while the domestic price was 21.11 RMB, and cement was priced at 90 RMB per ton, about 80% higher than the price within Yunnan Province.
On September 23, 1970, Mao Zedong, while meeting with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, said: "Doesn't Marxism talk about class? Talk about internationalism? The working class is not divided by national borders? Now other countries are fighting and bleeding, while our country has not fought, but is only providing some materials. Should we still talk about the price?"
According to statistics, from 1950 to 1978, the Chinese government signed and implemented dozens of agreements providing free economic and military aid to Vietnam, with a total value exceeding 20 billion USD. This included enough weapons and military supplies to equip over 2 million naval, land, and air forces, 450 complete projects (of which 339 had been completed by March 1978), 1,231 kilometers of highways, a total of 476 kilometers of railways, all tracks, locomotives, and carriages, over 700 various ships, and more than 30,000 vehicles, over 3,000 kilometers of oil pipelines, and over 2 million tons of gasoline, over 5 million tons of grain, over 300 million meters of cloth, and several hundred million USD in cash, ensuring the needs of the Vietnamese military and civilians for food, clothing, and daily necessities during the war.
In addition, at the request of Vietnam, the Chinese government sent over 20,000 experts and consultants over 28 years, with a total of 320,000 personnel from air defense, engineering, railways, and logistics support teams. To aid Vietnam, the Chinese people paid a huge price in terms of lives and property.
Laos:
On January 13, 1962, the Chinese government and the government of the Kingdom of Laos signed an agreement on air transport and road construction, with China responsible for building the road from Mengla in Yunnan to Phongsali in Laos. By the end of May 1978, China had sent 18 engineering teams and three labor teams totaling over 70,000 people, 投入各种施工机械 2250 多台。如果将路基作业完成的 3100 多万石，筑成两米宽、三米高的石墙，可以环绕老挝一周。平均每公里公路造价为人民币 31 万余元，所有的修建费用都算作中国政府给予老挝王国政府无偿的、不附带任何条件的经济援助。中国同时派出 2.1 万人的高炮部队担负老挝的防空任务。
Since 1960, China has provided military aid to Laos, including 115,000 rifles, 170 million rounds of ammunition, over 278 artillery pieces, 34 tanks and armored vehicles, 2,530 wireless radios, 2,654 wired radios, 773 vehicles, and 771 tons of main and sideline food. This aid was aimed at helping Laos resist American aggression and achieve independence and development.
Before 1979, China provided interest-free loans and free aid to Laos amounting to 955.6 million RMB, but in March 1979, Laos unilaterally announced the withdrawal of all Chinese aid personnel, leading to a decade-long diplomatic stalemate between the two countries.
Myanmar:
During Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Myanmar in 1954, he represented the new China in providing aid to Myanmar, which was facing a "rice crisis," signing trade agreements and contracts to purchase rice from Myanmar. In 1956, China's first aid to Myanmar was through the China Technology Import and Export Corporation, providing a complete set of equipment for a textile factory with 20,000 spindles to expand the Zhimai Textile Factory and sending experts to provide technical assistance for factory construction. In 1961, China and Myanmar signed the first economic and technical cooperation agreement, determining that China would provide Myanmar with a long-term interest-free loan of 30 million pounds, including materials and complete projects such as the Mitila Textile Factory, the Ruidong Paper Mill, the Bilin Sugar Refinery, the Brush Plywood Factory, and the Rolling Bridge.
Albania:
Due to a series of factors, after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, the Soviet Union naturally stopped its aid to Albania. However, China not only took over all the aid projects originally provided by the Soviet Union but also continuously expanded and increased its aid to Albania, to the extent that it almost met all of Albania's requests. During this period, although the projects provided by China to Albania were nominally "interest-free loans," they were essentially gifts. Over 6,000 engineering and technical personnel were dispatched to Albania for aid construction, with total economic and military aid amounting to 10 billion RMB (calculated based on the 1960s and 1970s), equivalent to about 6 billion USD.
At that time, China was extremely accommodating to Albania's requests, helping Albania build six large and small hydropower stations, with an installed capacity of 885,000 kilowatts by the time aid was stopped. Additionally, China provided a large amount of materials, over 1 million tons of industrial steel, 1.8 million tons of grain, thousands of agricultural tractors, and sent 6,000 experts to Albania, training 2,000 technical personnel. China also purchased two ships with its own money and established a joint shipping company with Albania, with a total tonnage of over 20,000 tons. In 1969, Enver Hoxha talked for more than six hours with visiting Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian, all about asking for things. When Li Xiannian asked when they planned to repay for all the things they took from us, Hoxha said they had never considered repayment.
Even when China faced a severe food crisis in the early 1960s, the Chinese government even transported grain purchased with precious foreign exchange to Albania in three batches.
At that time, Albania not only did not feel satisfied but also made various absurd requests to China. For example, after China helped Albania build a textile factory, but Albania did not grow cotton, it requested China to use foreign exchange to buy cotton for it, weave it into cloth, and then sell it back to China. The high-quality steel that China provided was rarely used, while Albania used it to make telephone poles, high-quality steel plates for factory floors, and even for roads. In 1961, Albania sent people to Beijing three times to ask for money and goods, even making many unrealistic requests. According to a report from Chinese Ambassador to Albania Geng Biao, the high-grade cement and rebar provided by China were used everywhere in Albania to build martyr memorials, with over 10,000 martyr memorials built across 28,000 square kilometers of territory. The fertilizer factory we aided in Albania produced 200,000 tons annually, averaging 400 kilograms per hectare, far exceeding the amount of fertilizer used in Chinese rural fields, but the aid fertilizer was carelessly left in the fields, exposed to the elements. Absurdly, when building the fertilizer factory, Albania was not confident in China's main machine and requested the Italian main machine, which broke down shortly after being used, and then requested China to use foreign exchange to buy Italian spare parts. Albania had no phosphate ore, and the raw materials used in the phosphate fertilizer factory built by China were still purchased from Morocco using foreign exchange.
In the winter of 1972, when Baluku (then Vice Premier and Minister of Defense) led a military delegation to visit China again, Albania made a huge military aid request: based on their "defending the enemy at the national gate" combat philosophy, they wanted to deploy 500 tanks or even more, which they hoped to obtain from China, along the Adriatic coast to build a "steel wall" against the "imperialist" NATO led by the United States and the "revisionist" Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union. Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out at that time that the war could not be fought this way; even if we gave you 500 tanks according to Albania's request, they might not necessarily be able to defeat the enemy, and this was not a one-time deal.
However, Albania was not discouraged and continued to provide their "latest intelligence," believing that the US and the Soviet Union were about to seize Albania by force, so they wanted China to provide them with such large military aid. Premier Zhou pointed out that Albania had no air superiority and no naval power, and if they were to fight, they could only engage in mobile warfare. Zhou Enlai finally said, "It is not yet apparent that the US and the Soviet Union are going to seize Albania by armed force. Why haven't we received this intelligence?" Zhou Enlai asked the Chinese generals around him, "Are we just eating for nothing?"
Later, in October 1974, Albanian Prime Minister Hoxha wrote a letter to Premier Zhou Enlai, strongly requesting that China, which was on the verge of economic collapse, continue to provide loans of up to 5 billion RMB during Albania's sixth five-year plan. By this time, China had long been unable to cope and was exhausted, but still agreed to a loan agreement totaling 1 billion RMB and agreed to extend the repayment period for previous loans. However, due to the slow progress of aid projects and the long-delayed arrival of aid materials, voices within the Albanian Labor Party condemning China as having "completely degenerated into revisionism" became increasingly loud and worsened. The Albanian party newspaper "Voice of the People," under Hoxha's instructions, slandered China's aid to Albania as a "plot" to "destroy" Albania's economy.
Unfortunately, this exaggerated aid from China did not earn any respect from Albania diplomatically.
In September 1969, during a visit to Vietnam for Ho Chi Minh's funeral, Soviet Premier Kosygin passed through Beijing, where he met with Zhou Enlai at the capital airport. This immediately caused great resentment in Albania. Because of this, at the subsequent celebration of our 20th anniversary of nation-building, Albania deliberately lowered the diplomatic level, which should have been attended by the Premier but was instead attended by a vice-chairman.
Later, in the summer of 1971 and spring of 1972, China successively hosted US presidential envoys Kissinger and Nixon in an attempt to normalize Sino-US relations, which again caused strong dissatisfaction in Albania. Hoxha declared emphatically that the friendship between China and Albania was based on opposing imperialism and Soviet revisionism, and now that China was colluding with American imperialism, it had at least undermined half of that foundation. Albanian newspapers published a series of articles that were extremely unfriendly to China in terms of wording and content. Sino-Albanian relations thus entered a "fall."
Since the Seventh Congress of the Albanian Labor Party in November 1976, relations between Albania and China completely broke down, with Hoxha publicly attacking China's domestic and foreign policies multiple times and creating various difficulties for economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. By 1978, Albania's anti-China stance had become rampant, especially as Hoxha repeatedly personally attacked China's domestic and foreign policies. He also attacked Chinese leaders, whether deceased like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai or current leaders like Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping, using various malicious language to label these leaders as "traitors" of Marxism-Leninism, and then attacked Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Zhan, and Ambassador Liu Zhenhua. How did China respond? In two sentences: no retorts, no comments.
With the successive deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and after Deng Xiaoping came to power, this distorted diplomatic relationship was finally corrected. Deng Xiaoping decisively changed the previous diplomatic attitude towards Albania, firmly announcing: Cut! Withdraw! Stop! This meant cutting off aid to Albania, withdrawing experts, and halting projects. We could no longer bear it. China had provided too much aid to Albania, and this heavy burden was becoming increasingly unbearable. On July 7, 1978, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially notified the Albanian Embassy in China, announcing the cessation of all economic and military aid to Albania and the withdrawal of aid personnel, leading to a complete rupture of Sino-Albanian relations.
After the aid was cut off, Albania began to attack China during every holiday and conference, making it a regular feature, with news media continuously publishing or broadcasting anti-China content. In his later years, Hoxha labeled many friendly individuals and political opponents as "Chinese spies" and slandered that most of the staff at the Chinese Embassy in Albania were sent by intelligence agencies. The entire country began to become extremely hostile towards China. According to Wang Hongqi, a journalist stationed in Albania for Xinhua News Agency at the time, he often encountered children in the streets shouting "Maimu (monkey)" at Chinese people and then running away!
Albania's actions were naturally aimed at shirking the debt of 10 billion RMB owed to the Chinese people. After years of loans provided by China, Albania certainly would not repay, and it could only be recorded in the accounts. Following the complete breakdown of relations between the two countries, this loan naturally became a sunk cost.
Cambodia:
In February 1956, Cambodian Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk made a friendly visit to China, and Premier Zhou Enlai expressed China's willingness to provide economic and technical assistance to Cambodia without any conditions or privileges. During this period, the Chinese government first donated 80,000 RMB to Cambodia through the Chinese Red Cross to help relieve the refugees affected by a fire in Phnom Penh at the end of the previous year. In June 1956, China and Cambodia signed a bilateral agreement, stating that China would provide 8 million pounds of free aid to Cambodia from 1956 to 1957 for material assistance and complete projects.
In May 1960, during Zhou Enlai's visit to Cambodia, both sides signed a supplementary protocol on the implementation of the economic aid agreement signed on June 21, 1956, with China again providing 4 million pounds of free aid. On February 17, 1963, the two governments exchanged letters to cancel the original donation of a small steel plant and a small machinery factory. To replace the canceled projects, in addition to providing the insufficient investment for the cement plant in Cambodia (about 1.6 million pounds), China would also help Cambodia build a glassware factory, a cotton ginning factory (including a packaging factory), and a cotton textile factory.
In January 1964, Prince Norodom Sihanouk entrusted Prince Binn to request China to assist in expanding the Siem Reap Airport. In May 1965, Chinese civil aviation experts went to Cambodia for surveying and design, and in September, both sides signed a memorandum of conversation, with China undertaking the design of the expansion project and supplying the necessary equipment and materials. Experts and technical personnel were dispatched to organize on-site construction. The airport expansion project began in March 1966 and was completed in April 1968, including a runway 2,550 meters long and 45 meters wide, a taxiway, a parking apron of 15,200 square meters, and nine technical buildings including a terminal and other facilities for navigation and lighting.
In April 1966, Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian visited Cambodia, and both sides signed the China-Cambodia Economic and Cultural Cooperation Agreement in Phnom Penh. To help Cambodia host the first Asian Emerging Nations Games, the Chinese government agreed to build an international village and a sports hall (completed in October of that year), with a total construction area of about 19,000 square meters, and provided materials, equipment, and sports facilities. The main aid also included the laboratory of the Royal University of Phnom Penh (12 laboratories and one internship workshop, completed in 1968) and a hospital building (with 200 beds, completed in 1969).
From 1956 to 1969, all of China's aid to Cambodia was free aid, totaling over 200 million RMB in economic aid and 36 million RMB in military aid. This included 54.7 million RMB for projects and materials that had been preliminarily agreed upon and were awaiting signing as of April 1966. The above-mentioned aid funds were divided according to the type of aid, with complete projects and individual equipment amounting to 128.21 million RMB, general materials 61.79 million RMB (mainly for local expenses), special aid 36.82 million RMB, and cash and cash equivalents 2.12 million RMB. To assist Cambodia with complete projects and conduct economic and technical investigations, China sent a total of 1,153 experts and technical personnel to Cambodia and accepted 205 Cambodian interns. At the same time, over 3,000 various professional and technical personnel were trained on-site for Cambodia.
During the subsequent "Khmer Republic" period (1971-1975), China continued to support Sihanouk, treating him as a head of state in Beijing. During this period, Prince Sihanouk formed an alliance with the Khmer Rouge to oppose the Lon Nol regime, while the Khmer Rouge gradually expanded its base in rural areas. The aid provided by China to Cambodia during this period included military and economic assistance, with military aid being the main focus. At that time, China, out of internationalist obligations, provided strong political and material support to Cambodia. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai repeatedly stated their full support for the armed struggle of the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk against American imperialism, with military supplies sent to Cambodia reaching 400 tons in 1970 and 50 trucks.
Mongolia:
Mongolia was one of the first countries to request aid from China, but at that time, China politely declined due to extreme domestic difficulties. Later, in 1954, Mongolia unceremoniously submitted a list of a total of 12,250 workers to China, including carpenters, masons, brick makers, lime burners, grain and vegetable planters, furniture makers, cooks, tailors, shoemakers, and dye workers, among nearly 40 trades. That year, China sent 8,200 workers to help Mongolia build schools, hospitals, sanatoriums, guesthouses for experts, thermal power plants, glass factories, paper mills, chicken farms, and even restore ancient temples. China could not manufacture the textile factory equipment requested by Mongolia and even used scarce foreign exchange to order it from the UK. From 1956 to 1959, China provided a total of 160 million rubles in free aid to Mongolia.
Nepal:
On August 1, 1955, China and Nepal signed and published a joint communiqué on establishing normal diplomatic relations. The establishment of friendly relations between China and Nepal also marked the starting point of China's aid to Nepal. In the same month that the two countries established diplomatic relations, several provinces in Nepal suffered from drought, with 3 million residents facing famine. The Chinese Red Cross donated 50,000 RMB to the Nepalese government as relief funds for disaster victims.
China's formal aid to Nepal began with a request for assistance made by Nepal in 1956. In January 1956, Nepal's newly appointed Prime Minister Acharya expressed a desire for economic aid from China during his inaugural speech.
Acharya subsequently visited China in September of that year, where he was warmly received by national leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai. As a significant outcome of this visit, China and Nepal signed the "Economic Aid Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Kingdom of Nepal," which stipulated:
"The People's Republic of China will provide the Kingdom of Nepal with 60 million Indian rupees in free aid within three years after the signing of this agreement... Of the 60 million Indian rupees, one-third will be given in cash in installments, and two-thirds will be provided in the form of machines, equipment, materials, and other goods that Nepal needs and that China can supply. The machines, equipment, materials, and other goods for aid will be separately agreed upon by the two governments."
In March 1960, Nepal's newly appointed Prime Minister Koirala visited China again, and the two governments publicly issued a joint communiqué, signing agreements on border issues and economic aid. Regarding economic aid, Koirala expressed hope that China could provide Nepal with 100 million rupees in economic aid, to which the Chinese side agreed to meet Nepal's request, and in the "Economic Aid Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal," it was stipulated:
"In order to assist the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal in developing its economy, the Government of the People's Republic of China is willing to provide the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal with free economic aid without any conditions or privileges within three years after this agreement comes into effect. The amount of aid will be 100 million Indian rupees. This aid, along with the remaining 40 million Indian rupees from the economic aid agreement between China and Nepal in 1956 that has not yet been utilized by the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal, will total 140 million Indian rupees, which the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal will use in installments according to the economic aid projects agreed upon by both sides."
In October 1961, when King Mahendra of Nepal visited China, he again expressed hope for aid from China, specifically stating during his talks with Zhou Enlai that "if China could help Nepal build a road from Kathmandu to Tibet, I think that would be a great thing." The Chinese side agreed to King Mahendra's proposal. To fully respect Nepal's sovereignty, Zhou Enlai proposed: "Once completed, the section within Nepal will be handed over to the Nepalese government, and during the construction, it should also be under the leadership of the Nepalese side."
Subsequently, on October 15, 1961, the two sides signed the "Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal on Road Construction," which stated:
"The Government of the People's Republic of China, at the request of the Government of His Majesty the King of Nepal, will provide free economic aid without any conditions or privileges for the construction of road projects within Nepal from July 1, 1962, to June 30, 1966. The amount of aid will be 3.5 million pounds."
From 1956 to 1975, China provided a total of 357 domestic projects to Nepal, of which 206 projects were completed, covering heavy industry, light industry, and the oil industry. Even during difficult times when China faced disasters, the Chinese government still worked hard to fulfill its promise to help Nepal. In 1961, Zhou Enlai pointed out to the Nepalese side: "Due to our country suffering from three consecutive years of natural disasters, we are importing grain this year, so our foreign exchange is also very difficult. We have not provided foreign exchange aid to other countries this year. Considering the situation in Nepal, the 10 million rupees in the agreement on four economic aids between China and Nepal can be partially provided this year or next." King Mahendra also expressed gratitude for China's selfless aid, saying, "I am very grateful; our Chinese friends understand our difficulties."
Indonesia:
China's early aid to Indonesia mainly occurred between 1958 and 1965, during which China provided six batches of aid to Indonesia.
The first batch of aid was a rice and cloth loan agreement signed on April 17, 1958, which stipulated that China would provide a loan of 48 million Swiss francs (approximately 11 million USD) to Indonesia. In October 1957, former Indonesian Vice President Hatta visited China and requested a loan of 20 million USD from China to help build a cotton textile factory.
In February 1958, to suppress local rebellions, Indonesia requested China to first supply a batch of rice and cotton cloth using the aforementioned loan, stating that the issue of building the factory could be discussed later. The Chinese government agreed and immediately shipped 20,000 tons of rice, 1.2 million pieces of cotton cloth, and 6,500 pieces of cotton yarn to Indonesia, totaling a value of 46.668 million Swiss francs. On April 17, 1958, the two countries confirmed the total loan amount to be 48 million Swiss francs (actual payment of 54.68 million RMB), which would be repaid by the Indonesian government in transferable pounds, other third-country currencies, or goods that China might accept from Indonesian exports, to be paid off over ten years at an interest rate of 2.5%. Although there was a balance of 1.332 million Swiss francs on the books, since China had already supplied the goods as requested by Indonesia, both sides agreed that the balance would no longer be used.
The second batch was a military supplies loan agreement signed on March 27, 1961, which stipulated that China would provide military loans of 7.51 million pounds (approximately 21 million USD) to Indonesia. During 1958-1959, to help the Indonesian government suppress local rebellions, China provided military supplies loans of 7.51 million pounds (actual payment of 68.99 million RMB). On March 27, 1961, the two countries signed an agreement stipulating a loan term of ten years, to be repaid from 1960 to 1970 at an interest rate of 2%. The military equipment included 51 aircraft, 6,000 semi-automatic rifles, 10 million rounds of ammunition, and 4 landing craft, as well as communication equipment, engineering equipment, and logistical supplies.
The third batch was an economic and technical cooperation agreement signed on October 11, 1961, which stipulated that China would provide a loan of 12.96 million Swiss francs (approximately 30 million USD) to Indonesia, with the Chinese government providing 150,000 to 160,000 spindles and 1,000 looms within four years. The loan would begin to be repaid two years after the factory was completed and put into production, to be paid off over 12 years at an interest rate of 2%.
The fourth batch was on January 28, 1965, where both sides stipulated in the convertible currency loan agreement and economic and technical cooperation agreement that China would provide Indonesia with 10 million USD in cash and 40 million USD in loans, totaling 50 million USD. At the end of 1964, during Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia, Subandrio presented a list of aid amounts at a farewell banquet, which included 40 million USD in commercial loans and 10 million USD in cash. On December 28, 1964, the Chinese government provided 4 million USD in cash loans to the Indonesian government and promised to provide another 6 million USD in the first half of 1965. The convertible currency loan agreement confirmed this. The economic and technical cooperation agreement stipulated that from February 1, 1965, to January 30, 1970, China would provide 40 million USD in loans to Indonesia, with half for complete equipment and half for goods, with 20% of the goods provided by China as local expenses. Both agreements were interest-free loans.
The fifth batch was on September 14, 1965, where both sides signed a protocol regarding the construction of the New Emerging Forces Conference Hall, which stipulated that the Chinese government would provide Indonesia with 43.7 million Swiss francs (approximately 10 million USD) in free aid. During the preparatory meeting for the second Afro-Asian Conference in April 1964, Chen Yi expressed that China was willing to help Indonesia build the Afro-Asian Conference Hall. However, the project was shelved. When Sukarno visited Shanghai in November 1964, Zhou Enlai expressed that China was willing to aid in the construction of the Bandung Conference Memorial Hall, and when Subandrio visited China in January 1965, Zhou Enlai expressed willingness to provide material support for the New Emerging Forces Conference. After Subandrio returned to Indonesia, the country agreed to accept this aid. In April 1965, during the 10th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai and Sukarno laid the foundation for the New Emerging Forces Conference Hall on September 14.
The sixth batch was signed in September 1965, where the economic and technical cooperation agreement and the China-Indonesia currency loan agreement stipulated that China would provide 100 million USD in interest-free loans, including 20 million in cash and 30 million in general goods, and 50 million for complete equipment projects, to be used within five years. During Chen Yi's visit to Indonesia in August 1965, he stated that China "could provide a larger amount of new loans than the previous 30 million or 50 million." The Indonesian economic delegation visited China on September 16. On September 30, Li Xiannian signed the China-Indonesia economic and technical cooperation agreement and the China-Indonesia currency loan agreement with Suharto, stipulating that China would provide Indonesia with 5 million USD in cash in 1966 and 1967, 4 million USD in 1968, and 3 million USD each in 1969 and 1970; the distribution ratio for goods loans within five years would be 10 million, 7 million, 5 million, 4 million, and 4 million USD.
In summary, the total amount of aid China provided to Indonesia from 1958 to 1965 was approximately 215 million USD, ranking first among China's aid to Asian and African nationalist countries at that time, with about 160 million USD provided in 1965 alone.
Cuba:
To help Cuba overcome economic difficulties, at the end of 1960, China and Cuba signed an agreement stipulating that China would provide an interest-free loan of 60 million USD to help Cuba build 24 industrial and agricultural projects, and also stipulated the training of 200 technical personnel for Cuba. In November 1960, when Zhou Enlai met with Guevara during his visit to China, he emphasized: "At the most difficult time for Cuba, the economic support that China provided within its capacity is fulfilling a bit of international obligation."
Between 1959 and 1965, the two countries signed two five-year and multiple annual trade agreements, with China's economic support for Cuba reflected in preferential trade, interest-free loans, and free material aid. Part of the interest-free loans came from China's trade surplus with Cuba, which was a flexible approach taken at that time to alleviate Cuba's trade deficit pressure with China. By 1965, the long-term interest-free loan amount converted from China's trade surplus to Cuba had reached as high as 40 million USD. Considering Cuba's repayment capacity, Zhou Enlai told the visiting Cuban government economic delegation in 1963: "Loans are just a formality; if they are not repaid or postponed, that is fine. If there are difficulties later, they can be postponed."
In 1963, when Cuba was hit by a major hurricane, the Chinese government mobilized rescue materials worth about 47.9 million RMB, including food, medicine, clothing, and educational supplies, from all over the country and quickly transported them to Cuba. When a central leader learned that a ship carrying rice for export from China was on its way in the open sea, he immediately decided to order the ship to change its course directly to Cuba.
Additionally, from 1962 to 1972, China consistently purchased Cuban sugar at prices higher than international market prices. According to the trade agreement signed between the two countries in July 1960, China would purchase 500,000 tons of raw sugar from Cuba over the next five years, with the international market price for sugar at only 0.025 USD per kilogram, while China purchased raw sugar from Cuba at 0.06 USD per kilogram, resulting in an additional payment of 285 million USD by China.
However, starting in the late 1960s, as Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated, Sino-Cuban relations also gradually cooled. Political exchanges between the two countries came to a standstill, and trade frictions gradually increased.
Hungary:
In 1952, Hungary experienced a famine, threatening the basic livelihood of its people. New China immediately supported Hungary with 50,000 tons of grain to ensure its survival. In March 1956, in response to the continuous debt collection by capitalist countries against Hungary, New China alleviated its difficulties through material aid. After the establishment of the Hungarian Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, New China followed the principle of non-interference in Hungary's internal affairs and provided free material and financial aid to the Hungarian government without any political conditions.
Yemen:
China established diplomatic relations with Yemen in mid-1956. In December 1957, New China aided Yemen in constructing a road from Sana'a to Hodeidah. At the same time, it provided funding, preferential loans, and complete sets of industrial equipment and machinery, dispatching technical experts and skilled workers to guide the projects. In February 1959, Yemen experienced a drought, and to help it through the difficulties, New China provided 10,000 tons of wheat as free aid. In terms of military aid, in response to British aggression against Yemen, New China provided military aid through loans from other countries to help Yemen achieve independence.
Countries in Africa:
As the region receiving the most aid from China outside the socialist camp, Africa received a total of approximately 6.28 billion to 7.25 billion RMB in aid from 1956 to 1979. China not only built the TAZARA Railway, the largest single complete project in Africa, but also invested substantial resources in various fields of aid, including industry, agriculture, education, and military. China's large-scale aid to Africa reached the point of "poor countries supporting rich countries."
Starting around September 1963, Mao Zedong changed the approach of reducing foreign aid to overcome economic difficulties under Liu and Deng's leadership in early 1962. Under his instructions, Wang Jiaxiang's "Three Harmonies and One Reduction" was comprehensively criticized within the party, and China's aid to Africa shifted from "acting within capacity" to disregarding costs.
After 1970, due to the easing of Sino-US relations, some African countries no longer hesitated to establish or restore diplomatic relations with China. In the two years following October 1970, China established or restored diplomatic relations with 15 African countries. To eliminate Taiwan's influence in Africa, the mainland began to consider replacing Taiwan's aid projects in Africa, with the agricultural technology aid project implemented in 1971 aimed at replacing Taiwan's non-agricultural teams as a typical case. At the same time, as the Soviet Union reduced its investment in Africa, the Chinese government believed this was an excellent opportunity to expand its influence in Africa.
The period from 1970 to 1972 was a time of rapid growth in China's foreign aid, with the newly signed aid amounts exceeding 60% of the previous 20 years. Africa became the region with the fastest growth in aid. In 1970, Zhou Enlai raised aid to Africa to the "second place" after Indochina. By 1972, half of the 12 newly aided countries were from Africa. In terms of aid conditions, China provided African countries with the same preferential treatment as socialist brother countries like Vietnam and Albania. In 1972, Zhou Enlai decided that all loans to Africa would be interest-free and could be repaid without conditions, which effectively converted a large amount of previous loans into free aid.
In 1973, China provided 303 complete projects to 38 countries, and that year, the aid list included eight new countries, five of which were from Africa. The US Central Intelligence Agency assessed that China's total aid to Africa that year amounted to 345 million USD, equivalent to about 800 million RMB, far exceeding the Soviet Union's 9 million USD at that time.
By the end of 1973, China's complete projects for aid to Africa rose to the forefront of all aid to socialist countries in Africa. Aid to Africa continued to rise in 1974, with Deputy Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Li Ke predicting that the proportion, scope, and scale of aid to Africa would continue to expand, as 32 of the 34 African countries that established or restored diplomatic relations with China had requested aid.
In addition to material and financial assistance, China also provided long-term medical aid to various African countries. Before 1978, all of China's medical aid to Africa was free, with the salaries, training, transportation, and medical equipment expenses of medical team members borne by China.
Among these, the expenditure on medical supplies was the largest, with the 15 medical teams in Tanzania and Madagascar consuming nearly one million RMB worth of medical supplies annually on average. According to statistics from Tan Yunhe, Deputy Minister of Health, from 1963 to 1978, the Chinese government spent an average of 12 million RMB annually on sending medical teams to Africa, with each medical team member consuming about 10,000 RMB worth of supplies annually. It was not until 1978 that China ended its policy of free medical aid, and the expenses borne by medical teams quickly decreased, with the Chinese government paying 1.216 million RMB for medical teams from 1978 to 1980.
Egypt:
Since 1956, the International Liaison Department has continuously monitored the activities of the Communist Parties in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. China initially regarded the "Nasser faction" as the best reliance for establishing an international and domestic anti-imperialist united front in North Africa, and the Suez Canal crisis that erupted in 1956 further strengthened China's determination to support Nasser against "imperialism." In November, China provided 4.4 million USD in free aid to Egypt while also attempting to mediate and improve relations between the Egyptian Communist Party and the Nasser government, promoting the formation of an international and domestic national united front. China also imparted combat experience to the majority faction of the Egyptian Communist Party (the Unified Communist Party) and urged Nasser to distribute weapons to the Egyptian Communist Party. To help Egypt break the Western blockade, China imported Egyptian cotton and cotton yarn worth a total of 36.37 million USD in 1954 and 1955, and in 1956, purchased Egyptian cotton worth 10 million pounds.
At the end of 1964, during a visit by Egypt's Vice Premier to China, both sides reached a friendly consensus on economic agreements and signed an agreement. After the agreement was signed, New China provided approximately 350 million Swiss francs to Egypt in the form of interest-free loans to support the construction of complete projects and provide individual equipment and raw materials. Additionally, during times of material shortages in Egypt, New China also provided corn, wheat, and other assistance to help them through difficulties.
Algeria:
In December 1958, China provided Algeria with 5 million USD in free aid, including 3 million USD in arms and 1 million USD each in materials and foreign exchange. In 1959, China continued to provide Algeria with 10.08 million RMB worth of clothing and medicines. In April 1960, China invited representatives of Algeria's temporary government to visit China and promised comprehensive support in military, economic, technical, and political aspects, providing military supplies worth 50.6 million RMB at that time. In 1963, China began sending medical teams to Algeria. In early 1964, during Zhou Enlai's visit to Algeria, the previous economic support plan was reaffirmed, especially the implementation of a 50 million USD loan agreed upon between China and Algeria in 1963.
Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Congo (Brazzaville):
In early 1959, when China established diplomatic relations with several countries, Guinea requested 15,000 tons of rice from China as free aid due to a poor harvest. China found Guinea's "positive attitude towards establishing diplomatic relations" and readily agreed to the aid request, quickly signing an agreement for the first batch of 5,000 tons of rice. In October 1959, a delegation from the Guinean government visited China to participate in the National Day celebrations, and both sides took the opportunity to reach a diplomatic agreement. China then provided Guinea with preferential loans to aid in building a number of infrastructure projects and factories. At that time, Guinea was wavering between the mainland and Taiwan, so China was eager to provide aid and even complained about Guinea's failure to promptly notify the required aid content. In May 1960, despite facing domestic economic difficulties, China proactively donated 10,000 tons of rice to Guinea and invited Guinea to send a delegation to Beijing to sign an economic and technical cooperation agreement, promising to provide "within capacity" assistance in agricultural cooperation, industry, and other fields.
Similarly, in 1959, China's aid to Ghana was put on the agenda following a trade delegation from Ghana visiting China. The Minister of Foreign Trade, Ye Jizhuang, discussed bilateral trade, technical assistance, and mutual dispatch of experts in detail with the delegation. Subsequently, in 1961, China signed economic and technical cooperation agreements and trade agreements with Ghana, aiding in the construction of an arms factory, training officers, and sending agricultural technology experts to Ghana for planting activities.
In May 1964, a Ghanaian government economic delegation led by El-Hef, the director of the presidential secretariat, visited China. To arrange the aid plan and determine the aid content, China arranged for them to visit production situations in various industries such as electric machinery, pharmaceuticals, textiles, dyeing, enamel, paper-making, food, leather, and agriculture in Shanghai and other places, even making exceptions to allow the delegation to visit a number of confidential factories such as the Shanghai Turbine Factory. In July, China signed a loan agreement with Ghana for 22.4 million USD to complete the aid projects in the aforementioned fields.
In 1964, Mali's leftist leader, President Keita's assistant and pro-China figure Kouyaté, brought a letter from the president to China seeking aid. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Liu Shaoqi had "comparatively comprehensive and in-depth" discussions with Kouyaté on political and economic issues, with China introducing its economic construction experience to Kouyaté. Kouyaté requested cash, grain, and industrial transportation aid, and China agreed to most of the requests. The factories built in Mali alone could save the country 19 million USD in foreign exchange, while the candy factory had an annual output value of several million USD.
In July 1964, China provided 25 million USD in interest-free loans and commodity credits to Congo (Brazzaville), a country with an annual budget of only 39 million USD, while France only provided 9 million USD. China's economic aid focused on small-scale industries producing consumer goods. In January 1965, Congo (Brazzaville) sent a delegation to China to visit 10,000-ton hydraulic presses and agricultural facilities and discuss specific aid projects. Additionally, China sent a group of military experts to train the Congolese army and the anti-government armed forces in Congo (Kinshasa).
Cameroon, Sudan, Kenya:
Cameroon in Central Africa and Sudan in East Africa were also key targets for China to gain through aid. In May 1959, China provided ten scholarships for studying in China to the Cameroon People's Union to train revolutionary cadres. On July 1, the vice-chairman of the Cameroon People's Union visited China to receive "donations." Three days later, the Cameroonian representatives requested China to provide weapons or financial aid, to which China quickly agreed.
Sudan was seen as a stronghold for access to Ethiopia and other Central and East African countries, and the two countries officially established diplomatic relations on February 4, 1959. At that time, China believed that it could "differentiate" and provide care to various factions in the Sudanese cabinet without interfering in the internal struggles. In late August, after being rejected by the UK, US, and Soviet Union, Sudanese Foreign Minister Hel made three consecutive requests for aid through the Chinese ambassador to Sudan. Considering that Sudan was one of the gateways to Black Africa, the Chinese side believed it necessary to seriously consider Hel's aid request, as this would expand China's role in Black Africa. In 1963, Sudan received a 47.6 million USD economic loan from China. In 1970 and 1971, China provided two interest-free loans totaling 200 million RMB to Sudan for domestic economic project construction. At the same time, China also provided 23.7 million USD in aid for its domestic industrial and public facility construction.
During Zhou Enlai's visit in 1963, Kenya received a long-term interest-free loan of 15.2 million USD and a grant of 2.8 million USD.
Angola:
In 1975, 343 Chinese military experts were sent to Kinshasa to train the Zaire Assault Brigade. This training program was actually a supplement to the military equipment aid provided by China to Zaire in 1974, rather than targeting the chaotic situation in Angola at that time. However, since Zaire was an important partner of the United States in Southern Africa and the biggest supporter behind the MPLA, after China restored diplomatic relations with Zaire in 1973, it regarded Zaire as its second aid proxy after Tanzania.
Starting in May 1974, China secretly dispatched 18 experts to assist in training 658 "freedom fighters" of the MPLA. In September of that year, the MPLA publicly announced that it had received 45 tons of military supplies and a batch of medical supplies from China. Therefore, the military training program launched in May undoubtedly sent the wrong message to the outside world that China and the US had begun to jointly support the MPLA against UNITA, which directly led to the breakdown of negotiations between UNITA and China.
With the full outbreak of the Angolan civil war in July, the US began to fully support the MPLA and UNITA, and the alliance between the Soviet Union and UNITA was solidified. At this time, China could only choose to support the MPLA, so in August, 93 tons of military supplies jointly aided by China and the South African apartheid regime were delivered to UNITA. At the same time, China also provided heavy weapons such as artillery and armored vehicles to the MPLA through Zaire. After Cuban troops entered the war, China sent 112 military advisors to the MPLA and provided 450 tons of weapons and a large amount of medicine.
However, due to the involvement of the racist South African regime, the MPLA and UNITA were seen as colluding with "imperialism" and "racism," and almost all major countries in Southern Africa turned to support UNITA. Even traditional friendly countries like Guinea and Tanzania began to express dissatisfaction with China's stance in the Angolan civil war. According to Qian Qichen's recollection, the President of Guinea considered China's stance to be an insult to his country. Despite the efforts of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to explain, the parties were not satisfied, and both sides ultimately had to avoid discussing the Angolan issue. Thus, China not only failed to prevent the Soviet Union and Cuba from controlling Angola but also worsened relations with most Black African countries, and the "anti-imperialist and anti-hegemonic united front" that Mao Zedong had sought to establish in Africa since the early 1960s encountered a major setback.
Tanzania and Zanzibar:
Tanzania was a key country for China's economic aid work in East Africa. According to estimates by the US Central Intelligence Agency, by June 1964, China had provided 28 million USD in loans and 3 million USD in grants to Tanganyika through the signing of economic and technical aid loan agreements, and provided a loan of 14 million USD and a grant of 500,000 USD to Zanzibar. In less than two years, China sent 12 expert teams to Tanzania to investigate and negotiate projects, during which it was decided to provide four complete aid projects.
The largest aid project China provided to Tanzania was the TAZARA Railway, which undoubtedly became a landmark project of China's aid to Africa, costing at least 1.8 billion RMB. In February 1965, during Nyerere's visit to China, the Chinese side expressed its agreement to aid in the construction of the railway within Tanzania. Although the final agreement was not signed until 1967, Chinese experts had already gone to Tanzania for surveying work in 1965.
In February 1965, Mao Zedong and other leaders confirmed during talks with Tanzanian President Nyerere that China would aid in building the TAZARA Railway, with Liu Shaoqi explicitly stating: "We will do what imperialists won't do; we will definitely help you build it!" At the same time, Zhou Enlai also believed that concentrating efforts on building such a large project would have effects and impacts that could not be compared to doing more small and medium-sized projects in other countries, as it would not only help Tanzania and Zambia break free from imperialist and colonialist control and extortion but also promote the national liberation movement across Africa.
Despite some officials believing that the investment in this project far exceeded China's national strength, under the banner of internationalism, China unhesitatingly agreed to aid in building this railway. Mao Zedong stated on the spot: "This railway only requires an investment of 100 million pounds, which is nothing," even saying: "We would rather not build our own railways than not help you build this railway." The construction of the TAZARA Railway began in October 1970. The Chinese government provided an interest-free loan of 988 million RMB for the construction of this railway. Over nearly six years of building the TAZARA Railway, China sent over 50,000 experts and technical personnel. During the construction process, due to outdated equipment, many times it was necessary to rely on "human sea tactics," and 65 Chinese engineering and technical personnel sacrificed their valuable lives for this.
China's aid to Zanzibar was even more comprehensive, as Zanzibar requested Chinese experts to customize specific revolutionary and construction plans. With the help of Chinese experts, Zanzibar implemented various socialist economic reform measures, including establishing state-owned trade stores. China's military aid also began to expand comprehensively in this country after 1964. In addition to providing military supplies to Zanzibar, China's military aid mainly focused on helping Tanzania establish bases and networks for training African "freedom fighters." In July 1964, Brigadier General Salakikia of the Tanganyika Armed Forces signed an agreement with Luo Ruiqing in Beijing regarding the dispatch of Chinese military experts to Tanzania. According to the agreement, China began sending military experts to two secret training camps in Dar es Salaam in September to assist the Tanzanian military in training anti-government guerrillas from Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia).
Somalia and Uganda:
Somalia was another important foothold for China to consolidate its position in East Africa. In November 1961, Somalia experienced flooding, and since China and Somalia had just established diplomatic relations in 1960, coupled with the friendly attitude of the Shermark government towards China, China provided 150,000 RMB in relief funds and domestic medicines equivalent to 150,000 RMB.
In January 1964, China proactively added aid to Somalia by providing a theater and free disaster relief grain and medicines worth 500,000 RMB. Prior to this, China had already decided to provide a large amount of aid to Somalia. In August 1963, former Somali Prime Minister Shermark visited China, and China and Somalia signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement. According to the agreement, from 1963 to 1970, China would provide Somalia with 80 million Swiss francs (approximately 6.35 million pounds) in interest-free loans, while China provided 3 million USD in financial aid to the Somali government from September 1963 to December 1964.
In 1965, China's aid in East Africa expanded to Uganda, located north of Tanzania. In April, China and the Ugandan government signed an agreement, stipulating that from July 1965 to June 1970, China would provide the Ugandan government with a long-term interest-free loan of 4.3 million pounds (equivalent to 29.64 million RMB) for the construction of a series of projects, including 1,000 acres of rice farms and tea gardens, a textile factory, a tire factory, a paper mill, a steel plant (with an annual output of 100,000 tons), cooperative stores, a national sports field, a broadcasting transmitter (one), a settlement (one), and the Ugandan People's Assembly Hall. At the same time, the Chinese government also provided Uganda with 1.07 million pounds (7.37551 million RMB) in financial aid, half of which was paid in cash and the other half in goods, with the cash portion to be provided in 1965 and the remaining portion in 1966.
Other Aid Recipients:
In addition to socialist countries and various countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, China also provided humanitarian aid to other countries multiple times.
For example, in 1953, the China People's Relief Association and other people's organizations raised funds to aid victims of floods in the UK and the Netherlands. In 1955, the Chinese Red Cross donated 20,000 Swiss francs in cash to the Greek Red Cross in response to an earthquake in Greece. In 1952, 1953, and 1959, relevant people's organizations provided relief to Japan three times. In the 1950s, China provided a total of 36 instances of humanitarian aid abroad, with aid to Western countries accounting for one-sixth of this total.
In August 1953, when floods occurred in India, the government originally suggested donating 1.05 billion RMB in the name of the China People's Relief Association and the Chinese Red Cross, but upon learning that the Soviet Union planned to donate 250,000 rubles (approximately 1.7 billion RMB), Mao Zedong instructed that "the amount should be increased to 1.5 billion or 2 billion RMB." Relevant departments ultimately set the aid amount at 1.5 billion RMB.
In June 1971, when a major blizzard struck Chile, China provided 5 million RMB in cash. In June 1972, China and Chile signed an economic cooperation agreement, with China providing a long-term interest-free loan of 20 million pounds to Chile, and in the same year, China also increased its supply of 1,500 tons of pork and 500 tons of chicken to Chile. In 1973, when political turmoil occurred in Chile, to assist Chile, Premier Zhou Enlai proactively suggested that China deposit 10 million pounds in cash in the Chilean bank as interest-free loans for the Chilean government to use.
In June 1970, when an earthquake struck Peru, China provided 1.5 million RMB in cash. In November 1971, China provided 17 million pounds in interest-free loans to Peru. In April 1972, China provided 10 million pounds in interest-free loans to Guyana and sent experts to guide rice production. In March 1975, China provided 20 million RMB in interest-free loans to Guyana.
Shift in China's Foreign Aid Policy:
In July 1977, with the convening of the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping made a comeback, and various fields in China began to reorganize, with the costly foreign aid projects naturally being the first to be addressed.
Deng Xiaoping's first major decision in the field of foreign aid was to comprehensively reduce the scale of foreign aid. In July 1978, Deng Xiaoping instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to issue notices to Vietnam and Albania, demanding an immediate cessation of aid, shedding burdens, and completely breaking away from the distorted relationships regarding aid with Vietnam and Albania.
After several years of governance and adjustment, China's foreign aid expenditure as a proportion of fiscal expenditure decreased from 6.904% in 1973 to 0.766% in 1979. The burden of foreign aid work was greatly alleviated. Subsequently, in March 1979, Deng Xiaoping also agreed to rehabilitate Wang Jiaxiang, pointing out:
"Comrade Wang Jiaxiang, based on the actual situation at that time, proposed some suggestions on foreign strategies and guidelines to the Central Committee. The organization was not wrong in principle, and the overall spirit was correct. The so-called 'Three Harmonies and One Reduction' and 'Three Reductions and One Elimination' issues should be rehabilitated, and all the false accusations imposed on Comrade Wang Jiaxiang and other comrades should be overturned."
The rehabilitation of Comrade Wang Jiaxiang marked a shift in China's approach to foreign aid policy, and from then on, China began to gradually transition from being an aid-giving country to becoming a recipient of aid.
In the following decades, China began to receive a large amount of funding, projects, and technical assistance from developed countries. Active aid providers in China included international multilateral aid agencies, numerous members of economic cooperation and development organizations/development assistance committees, and various foundations and non-governmental organizations of different scales and forms. Due to China's vast territory and large population, it could accommodate various aid providers, and when it began to accept Western aid, it established the principle of "taking the initiative and using it for its own benefit," allowing China to more consciously guide foreign aid in a direction beneficial to itself and to carry out gradual reforms through foreign aid.
From 1979 to 2006, China received a total of 6.3 billion USD in bilateral and multilateral free aid, implementing over 1,000 projects. In 1995, China's acceptance of aid from various sources peaked, making it the world's largest recipient of aid, and this influx of overseas funds and technology provided significant assistance for China's economic takeoff.