George F. Kennan: "The Sources of Soviet Conduct"
I.
The political character of the Soviet regime we see today is a product of ideology and environment: the ideology inherited by the current Soviet leaders from the movement that produced their political background and the environment of the regime they have controlled in Russia for nearly thirty years. Few psychological analyses are as difficult as clarifying the interaction of these two factors and the role of each in determining Soviet behavior. Nevertheless, such an effort must be made to understand and effectively deal with Soviet actions.
It is difficult to summarize the entire set of ideological concepts that Soviet leaders brought with them when they seized power. Marx's theories have undergone subtle changes in the Russian version of communism. The materials that serve as the theoretical foundation are broad and complex. However, by 1916, the main content of Russian communist thought can be summarized as follows: (a) the central factor of human life is the system of production and exchange of material products, which determines the nature of social life and the "social appearance"; (b) the capitalist mode of production is evil, inevitably leading to the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class, failing to fully develop the socio-economic system and fairly distribute the material products created by laborers; (c) capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction, as the capitalist class cannot adapt to economic changes, inevitably provoking revolution and transferring power to the working class; (d) imperialism, as the final stage of capitalism, must lead to war and revolution.
Other content can be summarized in Lenin's own words: "The unevenness of economic and political development is the absolute law of capitalism. From this, it should be concluded that socialism may first triumph in a few or even a single capitalist country. The proletariat that wins in this country, having deprived the capitalists and organized socialist production in its own country, will rise against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed classes of other countries to its side..." It should be noted that they believed that without a proletarian revolution, capitalism would not die out on its own. To overthrow the crumbling system, there must be a final impetus from the proletarian revolutionary movement. This impetus is believed to be inevitable in the long run.
For more than fifty years before the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, those involved in the revolutionary movement fervently adhered to this set of ideas. Frustrated, dissatisfied, and lacking hope for self-expression (or eager for self-expression), and faced with the tight control of the Tsarist regime, they chose bloody revolution as a means to improve social conditions. This behavior lacked broad support, so these revolutionaries found a very convenient theoretical basis for their instinctive desires in Marxist theory. Marxist theory provided them with a scientifically flawed theoretical justification for their restless emotions, total denial of the values under the Tsarist regime, desire for power, and the tendency to seek shortcuts to realize these desires. Therefore, it is not surprising that they firmly believed that Marxism-Leninism was absolutely true, rational, and effective, as this doctrine catered to their impulsive and passionate psychology. There is no need to doubt their piety. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. Edward Gibbon put it most incisively when he wrote in "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire": "The step from faith to deception is very dangerous and often unconscious; the wise Socrates tells us that the clever may deceive themselves, and the good may deceive others, and that human conscience is in a state of mixed self-delusion and intentional deception." It was with this entire set of ideas that the Bolshevik Party seized power.
It should be noted that throughout the period of preparing for the revolution, these individuals, like Marx himself, focused more on defeating their rivals than on the form socialism would take in the future; in their view, the former took precedence over the latter. Once in power, their views on the program that should be implemented were largely vague, utopian, and unrealistic. Apart from the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital, there was no unified programmatic guideline. Their approach to the peasants (which, according to Marxist formulas, differed from that towards the proletariat) was an ambiguous issue in Russian communist thought and remained a contentious and indecisive issue during the first ten years of Communist Party rule.
The environment in the initial period after the revolution—civil war, foreign intervention, and the fact that the communists represented only a tiny fraction of the Russian people—necessitated the establishment of a dictatorial regime. "War communism" and the hasty elimination of private production and commerce led to adverse economic consequences and provoked more hostility towards the nascent regime. The temporarily slow process of communizing Russia was marked by the New Economic Policy, which alleviated some economic difficulties and achieved certain objectives. However, it also indicated that "capitalist elements in society" always managed to benefit from the government's relaxation of policies, and if allowed to continue existing, they would always pose a significant threat and competition to the Soviet regime. The situation of individual farmers was similar; despite their limited power, they were also private producers.
If Lenin were alive, for the ultimate benefit of Russian society, he might have reconciled these conflicting forces with the stature of a great man, though we cannot be sure he would actually do so. Even if Lenin would do this, Stalin and his followers in the struggle for Lenin's legacy would not tolerate the existence of competing political forces under their coveted regime. Their insecurity was too intense. Their unique extreme fervor and vigilance were incompatible with the Anglo-Saxon tradition of compromise, making long-term decentralization impossible. From the Russian-Asian world that birthed them, they formed a deep skepticism about the possibility of peacefully coexisting with competing forces. Due to their blind faith in the correctness of their doctrine, they always insisted that competing forces either submit to them or be eliminated. The Russian society outside the Communist Party itself was not rigid. Any form of collective action and organization was manipulated by the Party. In Russia, no other vibrant and charismatic organizations were allowed to exist. Only the Party had a strict organizational structure. Outside the Party, there was only disorganized, aimless chaos.
The situation within the Soviet Party was similar. Although party members might participate in elections and in formulating, discussing, and implementing policies, their participation was not based on their own will but rather on the need to align with the directives of the higher Party leadership and interpret the meaning of the "instructions."
It should be emphasized again that these individuals engaged in despotism perhaps not out of personal motives. They undoubtedly believed—and easily so—that they knew what was beneficial for society, and once power was secured and unchangeable, they would strive to promote the welfare of society. To achieve the consolidation of power, they disregarded divine commandments and human morals, using any means necessary. Only when they felt secure would they begin to consider how to make the people who trusted them live happily and comfortably.
Regarding the most prominent environment of the Soviet regime, it is worth noting that, to this day, the process of political consolidation of the regime has not been completed, and those in the Kremlin are still deeply entrenched in the struggle to consolidate and strengthen the power they gained in 1917. Their main purpose in doing so is to deal with internal opposition forces, but there is also an intention to confront the external world. Because ideology teaches them that the external world is hostile to the Soviet Union, ultimately overthrowing foreign political forces is their historical mission. Russian history and tradition support this understanding. Ultimately, their provocative and uncompromising actions have provoked reactions from the external world. Thus, to use Gibbon's words, they are forced to deal with the hostile actions they have instigated. By portraying the external world as their enemy, they justify their own correctness; this is an undeniable privilege that everyone possesses; for if one frequently and repeatedly believes this and bases their actions on it, they must be correct.
Due to the characteristics of their spiritual world and ideology, Soviet leaders never acknowledge that the hostility towards them contains reasonable and just elements. This hostility, theoretically, can only come from reactionary, stubborn, and dying capitalism. As long as the official acknowledgment of the remnants of capitalism in Russia exists, it can be used as a reason to maintain the dictatorial regime. However, when these remnants begin to gradually disappear, the legitimacy of the dictatorial regime becomes increasingly untenable, and when the official declaration states that these remnants have been finally eliminated, the rationale for their existence is completely lost. This prompts the Soviet ruling group to adopt new methods, as capitalism no longer exists in Russia, while the existence of serious and widespread dissident forces spontaneously arising among the people under their rule is not allowed. Thus, it becomes necessary to emphasize the threat of foreign capitalism to provide a legitimate basis for continuing to maintain the dictatorial system.
This practice began long ago. In 1924, Stalin specifically pointed out that maintaining the "repressive apparatus" (mainly referring to the military and secret police) was necessary because "as long as capitalism surrounds us, there is a danger of intervention and all the consequences that arise from it." According to this theory, from that time on, all opposition forces within Russia were described as agents of foreign reactionary forces hostile to the Soviet regime.
Similarly, they emphasized the fundamental antagonism between socialism and capitalism, a communist viewpoint. Many facts prove this to be unfounded. On one hand, there indeed exists a hostile mentality abroad caused by Soviet philosophy and actions; on the other hand, at certain points in history, military powers, especially Nazi Germany and Japan in the 1930s, did have plans to invade the Soviet Union, obscuring the true situation. But in fact, Moscow's emphasis on facing threats from the external world to Soviet society is not due to a real hostility from abroad, but rather to create excuses for maintaining the domestic dictatorial regime.
Therefore, maintaining the current Soviet regime, establishing supreme authority domestically, and fabricating the myth of foreign hostility all determine the characteristics of the Soviet regime machine we see today. Domestic agencies that fail to adapt to these purposes are gradually reduced and eliminated, while those that do are continuously expanded. The security of the Soviet regime is built on the iron discipline of the Party, the omnipresent and brutally harsh secret police, and a solid state economic monopoly. The Soviet leaders' ability to deal with competing forces in pursuit of security has largely turned the "repressive apparatus" into a supreme ruler over the people (whom they are supposed to serve). Today, the main task of the Soviet regime's key institutions is to perfect the dictatorial system and maintain the notion among the populace that Russia is under siege, with enemies at the gates. The millions of bureaucrats that make up the power structure must do everything possible to maintain this notion among the people; otherwise, they themselves would be redundant.
At present, it seems that the Russian rulers will not dismantle the repressive apparatus. The process of establishing a dictatorial regime has been underway for nearly thirty years, which is unprecedented in contemporary times (at least in terms of its scope). It has not only provoked hostility abroad but has also led to domestic resistance. The strengthening of police forces has resulted in the potential power opposing the regime becoming increasingly strong and dangerous.
The Russian rulers will never abandon the myth they use to maintain their dictatorial regime. Because this myth has become an inseparable part of Soviet philosophy, it has been deeply embedded in the Soviet ideological system through bonds stronger than mere ideological power.
II.
Having discussed so much historical background, how does it reflect on the political character of the Soviet regime we see today?
The traditional ideological theory has not been abandoned. They still firmly believe that capitalism is evil and destined to perish, and that the historical mission of the proletariat is to bring about the demise of capitalism and seize power for themselves. However, they emphasize more concepts related to the Soviet regime itself, namely the status of being the only and true socialist regime in a dark, misguided world and the power relations within it.
Among these concepts, they first emphasize the inherent antagonism between capitalism and socialism. We have seen that this concept is so deeply embedded in the foundation of the Soviet regime. It has a profound impact on the behavior of the Soviet Union as a member of the international community. This means that the Soviet Union can never truly believe that it shares common goals with capitalist powers. Moscow always believes that the purpose of the capitalist world is to be hostile to the Soviet Union, and thus contrary to the interests of the Soviet people it controls. If at some point the Soviet Union were to sign an agreement that contradicts this notion, it would merely be a tactical maneuver against its adversaries, with the Soviet approach being "buyer beware." The Soviets claim that this antagonism still exists. This is fictitious. This gives rise to many puzzling phenomena in Kremlin foreign policy: evasiveness, secrecy, deceit, suspicion, and malice. In the foreseeable future, these phenomena will not disappear. Of course, their degree and emphasis may vary. When the Soviets have something to gain from us, such behaviors may moderate; at such times, some Americans may be overjoyed, believing that "the Russians have changed," and some even take credit for supposedly bringing about this "change." We must not be deceived by tactical maneuvers. The characteristics of Soviet policy and the concepts that lead to them are closely related to the nature of the internal regime; as long as the nature of the Soviet regime does not change, we will inevitably face this behavior, whether explicit or implicit.
This means that for a long time to come, the Soviet Union will remain difficult to deal with. But this does not mean that the Soviet Union will engage in a life-and-death struggle to overthrow our social system within a specific timeframe. Fortunately, the Soviet theory that capitalism will ultimately perish contains the implication that it is not in a hurry to achieve this goal. Progressive forces can prepare for the final showdown over the long term. In the meantime, it is crucial that domestic and foreign communists should love and defend the "socialist motherland"—the victorious Soviet Socialist Union, as the center of socialist power, promoting its prosperity and troubling and eliminating its enemies. Implementing immature, "adventurous" revolutionary plans abroad would embarrass Moscow and thus be regarded as "unforgivable" or even "counter-revolutionary" actions. The socialist cause defined by Moscow is to support and develop the strength of the Soviet Union.
Let us look at the second concept of the Soviet Union, namely that the Kremlin is invariably correct. In the ideological framework of Soviet power, the existence of independent organizations other than the Party is not allowed, so theoretically, the Party's leadership must be regarded as the sole source of truth. If there is truth elsewhere, then other organizations should be allowed to exist and freely express their will, which the Kremlin cannot and will not allow.
Therefore, the Party's leadership is always correct, even since Stalin formally established his personal power by announcing the principle of unanimity in the Politburo in 1929.
Because the Party is invariably correct, there is the iron discipline of the Party. In fact, the two are mutually reinforcing. Establishing strict discipline requires acknowledging the Party's consistent correctness, and the Party's consistent correctness demands adherence to discipline. Together, they determine the behavior of the entire Soviet regime machine. If the third factor is not considered, it is insufficient to understand the role of these two, namely that the Party can propose any theory at any time for strategic reasons if it is deemed beneficial to its cause and requires all Party members to faithfully and unconditionally accept this theory. This means that truth is not eternal; it can actually be created by Soviet leaders according to their needs and purposes. Truth can differ weekly, monthly; it is not absolute or immutable—it does not arise from objective reality. It is merely a declaration of the wisdom of certain individuals at that time, as they represent the laws of history. These factors cause the goals of the Soviet regime machine to be rigid and obstinate. Such goals can be arbitrarily changed by the Kremlin, which other countries cannot do. Once a Party line is established on a particular issue, the entire Soviet government apparatus, including the diplomatic corps, moves forward like a wound-up toy car along a predetermined path until it encounters an irresistible force that stops it. The individuals making up this regime machine are not swayed by external arguments and reasons. Their entire education teaches them to distrust and suspect the external world. Like a white dog in front of a phonograph, they only listen to the "master's voice." Only the master can change their goals. Therefore, foreign diplomats cannot expect their words to influence Soviet leaders. At most, they can hope that their words will be conveyed to the highest echelons of Soviet leadership, as only they can change the Party line. However, these individuals are unlikely to be swayed by the usual logic of bourgeois representatives. Due to differing goals, their modes of thinking cannot be aligned. Therefore, facts are more persuasive to the Kremlin than words; only words backed by irrefutable facts will be heard by Russians.
However, we already know that ideology does not require them to rush to achieve their goals. Like the church, they only manage ideological concepts (which have long-term significance) and can patiently wait for the realization of their goals. They will never risk losing what they have achieved for an illusory future. Lenin himself taught that the pursuit of communist goals should be cautious and flexible. This admonition is made even more important by the lessons of Russian history: after centuries of chaotic warfare with nomadic peoples on defenseless vast plains, caution, thorough consideration, flexibility, and deceit are very useful qualities; these qualities are esteemed by both Russians and Eastern peoples. Therefore, Russians do not feel ashamed to retreat in the face of a stronger enemy. Without a specific timeframe for achieving their goals, they will not be anxious about making necessary retreats. Russian political behavior resembles a continuously flowing stream, moving toward a predetermined goal. It mainly concerns filling every corner and crevice of the global power basin that can be reached. If it encounters insurmountable obstacles along the way, it will accept and adapt to this reality with equanimity. The important thing is to always move toward a final goal. In Soviet philosophy, there is no notion that goals must be achieved within a specific timeframe.
Thus, dealing with Soviet diplomacy is both easier and more difficult than dealing with highly aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On one hand, they are more sensitive to the strength of their adversaries, and when they feel that the opposing force is too strong, they are more willing to make concessions diplomatically, thus being more rational in the logic and language of power. On the other hand, a single victory by the adversary does not defeat them or cause them to lose confidence. Due to their steadfastness, dealing with Russia cannot rely on occasional actions that reflect the demands of public opinion in the democratic world; rather, it requires the implementation of wise, far-sighted policies that are no less determined in their goals and flexible in their execution than Soviet policies.
In this situation, it is clear that the main aspect of American policy towards the Soviet Union is a long-term, patient but firm, and vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies. It should be noted that this policy is incompatible with posturing; it does not equate to threats, intimidation, or adopting a "hardline" stance. Although the Kremlin's response to political realities is fundamentally flexible, this does not mean it will disregard its reputation. Like almost all other governments, the Soviet regime will not back down in the face of clumsy intimidation. Russian leaders understand human psychology well; they know that losing one's temper and losing control is not a source of strength in political activity. They will exploit this weakness of the adversary to the fullest. Therefore, to effectively deal with Russia, foreign governments must absolutely maintain calm and composure at all times, making demands of Russia in a manner that does not easily damage their prestige.
III.
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the pressure the Soviet Union exerts on the free institutions of the Western world can be contained through the flexible and vigilant use of resistance forces at a series of changing geographical and political points, in accordance with changes in Russian policies and tactics; it cannot simply be wished away or persuaded into nonexistence. The Russians expect to endure forever and see that they have achieved great accomplishments. It should be remembered that there was a time when the Communist Party was less representative domestically than the Soviet Union is today in the world.
If ideology leads Russian rulers to believe that truth is on their side, they can patiently wait for ultimate victory; then we, unbound by this ideology, can freely and objectively judge whether this argument holds water. The Soviet theory implies that it not only completely disallows Western control over its economic lifeline but also envisions that Russia can maintain unity, discipline, and resilience for a long time. What would it mean for Russia if the West were to contain the Soviet regime for 10 to 15 years with sufficient resources and strength?
Soviet leaders utilize the conveniences that modern technology brings to despotism, ensuring that the people are compliant under their regime. Very few challenge their authority, and those who do are defeated before the state's repressive apparatus.
The Kremlin has also proven itself capable of disregarding the interests of its residents, establishing a foundation for heavy industry in Russia, although this process is not yet complete, it continues to develop and is increasingly approaching the level of major industrial nations. All of this, whether maintaining domestic political security or establishing heavy industry, comes at the cost of the people's lives being oppressed, their expectations unmet, and their energies drained. It requires the use of forced labor, the scale and extent of which are unprecedented in modern peacetime society. It leads to the neglect and harm of other aspects of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumer goods production, housing construction, and transportation.
Moreover, war has resulted in enormous property losses, heavy casualties, and exhausted populations. All of this has left today's Soviets physically and mentally fatigued. The masses feel disappointed and no longer easily deceived; if the Soviet regime still has some allure abroad, it is no longer as attractive domestically as it once was. The opportunity given to religion to survive during wartime for strategic reasons has been seized with great enthusiasm by the people. This fact eloquently demonstrates that the people do not exhibit much faith or dedication to the regime's goals.
In this context, the physical and mental strength of the people is limited. If this limit is exceeded, even the most brutal dictatorial government cannot drive them. Forced labor camps and other coercive agencies compel people to work under temporary conditions, with working hours exceeding what laborers are willing to endure and what mere economic pressure allows; even if they manage to escape, they will have aged and become victims of despotism. In any of the above situations, their primary strength has not been utilized to benefit society and serve the state.
Hope lies only with the younger generation. Despite their hardships, the youth are numerous and vibrant; moreover, the Russian nation is a talented one. However, it remains to be seen what impact the mental pressures imposed by the Soviet dictatorial regime during childhood, which have grown with the war, will have on their behavior as adults. Apart from the most remote farms and villages, concepts such as home security and peace no longer exist in the Soviet Union. It is still unclear whether this will affect the overall capabilities of the new generation that is maturing.
Additionally, while the Soviet economy has achieved some remarkable developments, its growth is unbalanced and flawed. The Russian communists who say "capitalism develops unevenly" should feel ashamed when they think of their own national economic situation. Certain sectors of the Soviet economy, such as metallurgy and machinery manufacturing, occupy a disproportionately large share compared to others. When there is only a primitive railway network that cannot even be called a road network, they actually aspire to become one of the world's industrial powers in a short time. Although they have made considerable efforts to improve labor productivity and teach very primitive farmers some basic machine operation knowledge, the entire Soviet economy is severely mismanaged, with urgent construction investments of poor quality and high depreciation costs; in vast economic sectors, they have yet to apply the production concepts and technical pride that skilled Western workers possess.
It is hard to believe that these shortcomings can be overcome by a fatigued and demoralized populace in the short term, as they live under the shadow of fear and pressure. As long as these shortcomings remain unaddressed, Russia will continue to be an economically fragile and, in a sense, weak country, capable of exporting its enthusiasm and emitting that strange political charm, but unable to sustain exports based on genuine material strength and prosperous products.
At the same time, Soviet political life is also extremely unstable. This instability arises from the transfer of power from one person or group to another.
This primarily concerns Stalin's personal status. We should know that Stalin's rise to become the leader of the communist movement, replacing Lenin, was merely the first transfer of personal authority in the Soviet Union. This transfer took 12 years to consolidate. It caused the deaths of millions and fundamentally impacted the country. Its effects reached the entire international revolutionary movement, which was extremely detrimental to the Kremlin itself.
It is possible that the next transfer of supreme power will be quiet and unobtrusive, not provoking reactions in other regions. However, in Lenin's words, this could likely lead to a rapid transition from "cunning deception" to "brutal violence," a characteristic of Russian history that would fundamentally shake the foundations of the Soviet regime.
But this is not just a matter of Stalin himself. Since 1938, there has been a dangerously stagnant situation in the political life of the senior leadership of the Soviet regime. Theoretically, the All-Russian Soviet Congress is the highest power institution of the Party, meeting at least once every three years. However, it has been almost eight years since the last congress convened. During this period, the number of Party members has doubled. Many Party members died during the war; today, more than half of the members were admitted after the last Party congress. Meanwhile, after the nation has undergone dramatic changes, the same small group of people still occupies the highest positions. Indeed, there are certain reasons that have caused fundamental political changes in the governments of every major Western power due to the war, and the reasons for this phenomenon also fundamentally exist in the perplexing political life of the Soviet Union, but these reasons have not been acknowledged in Russia.
Even in a highly disciplined organization like the Communist Party, the differences in age, views, and interests between the large number of recently joined Party members and the small group that has held the highest leadership positions for life will inevitably widen. Most Party members have never seen these top leaders, never spoken to them, and cannot have close political ties with them.
In this situation, who can guarantee that the transition of Party leadership from old to new (which is only a matter of time) can proceed smoothly and peacefully, or that competitors will not seek the support of these immature, inexperienced masses for their own goals? If such a situation truly arises, it will produce unimaginable consequences, because generally speaking, all Party members have been accustomed to iron discipline and obedience, making them unaccustomed to compromise and reconciliation. If unity is destroyed, rendering the Party paralyzed, Russian society will experience indescribable chaos and weakness. Because we know that the Soviet regime is merely a shell containing a group of disorganized masses. The current generation of Russians knows nothing of spontaneous collective action. If circumstances arise that disrupt the Party's unity and efficiency as a political tool, the Soviet Union could very likely transform overnight from one of the strongest nations into one of the weakest and most pitiable.
Therefore, the future of the Soviet regime will not be as secure as the Kremlinism imagines. They show that they can maintain power. Whether they can calmly and smoothly complete the transition of power from old to new remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the tyranny of the domestic regime and the turbulence of international life have severely undermined the great people upon whom this regime relies, causing them to lose hope. It is quite surprising that today, the ideological power of the Soviet regime has a greater impact outside Russia, beyond the reach of its police forces. This phenomenon recalls a metaphor used by Thomas Mann in his famous novel "Buddenbrooks." Thomas Mann believed that when human organizations have seriously decayed internally, they often appear very strong externally; he compared the Buddenbrooks family at its peak to one of the brightest stars shining on Earth but which has long since ceased to exist. Who dares to deny that the bright light the Kremlin casts on the disappointed and discontented people of the Western world is not, in fact, the fading glow of a constellation that is about to disappear? It cannot be proven that this is the case, nor can it be proven that it is not. However, there exists a possibility (which the author believes is quite large) that the Soviet regime, just like the capitalist world they speak of, contains the seeds of decay, which have already begun to sprout and grow.
IV.
Clearly, the United States cannot expect to maintain close relations with the Soviet regime in the foreseeable future. On the political stage, the Soviet Union should continue to be regarded as a competitor rather than a partner. The Soviet Union cannot sincerely love peace and stability in the future, nor can it believe that the socialist world and the capitalist world can coexist peacefully and amicably for a long time; rather, it will cautiously and relentlessly exert pressure to weaken and undermine the influence and power of all competitors.
However, although Russia is generally hostile to the West, it is still a relatively weak country, its policies are quite flexible, and Soviet society contains the seeds of decay. This requires the United States to have confidence in a firm containment policy, using unalterable counteracting forces at every point where the Russians show signs of infringing upon world peace and stability.
But in reality, American policy is not purely about maintaining the status quo and waiting for opportunities. American security can influence the development of internal Soviet affairs and even the entire international communist movement through its actions (Russian policies are mainly formulated based on this). This does not simply refer to conducting intelligence activities in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, although this is also important. Most importantly, the United States must create the impression among the world's peoples that it has clear objectives, can successfully address domestic issues, can shoulder the responsibilities of a world power, and can maintain its beliefs in the face of several major ideological currents currently at play. If this is achieved, the Soviet communist goals will be as hopelessly unattainable as Don Quixote's dreams, and the hopes and enthusiasm of Moscow's followers will gradually diminish, adding new difficulties to the Kremlin's foreign policy. Because the myth that capitalism will inevitably decline is the cornerstone of communist philosophy. Even after World War II, the fact that the United States did not experience the decline predicted by the crows of Red Square will have powerful and far-reaching repercussions in the communist world.
Similarly, if the United States shows signs of indecision, discord, and internal division, this will greatly encourage the entire communist movement. If any of these tendencies arise, the communist world will be greatly emboldened and jubilant; Moscow will appear triumphant; Moscow's supporters abroad will increase; and Moscow's influence in international affairs will be significantly strengthened.
To say that the United States alone can decisively influence the fate of the communist movement and quickly bring down the Soviet regime in Russia is an exaggeration. However, the United States can indeed exert tremendous pressure on Soviet policies, forcing the Kremlin to act more moderately and wisely than it has in recent years, ultimately leading to the collapse or gradual softening of the Russian regime. Because any mysterious savior movement—especially the Kremlin's savior movement—if it does not adapt itself to the logic of unfolding events, will inevitably encounter setbacks.
Therefore, the decision-making power largely rests with the United States. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is essentially a test of the values of the United States as one of the world's nations. To avoid destruction, the United States only needs to reach its best national traditions and prove itself worthy of survival as a great nation.
Indeed, there is no fairer test of national quality than this. In this case, astute observers of U.S.-Soviet relations have no reason to complain about the Kremlin's challenges to the United States. They should thank God for presenting the American people with this unchangeable challenge, thereby making the safety of the entire American nation dependent on their unity and acceptance of the moral and political leadership responsibilities that history demands of them.